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Several pathways lead into a low-carbon, 
high-efficiency future. Many go through 
something commonly called ‘sectoral 
crediting’, by which developing 
economies would both adopt emission 
reduction goals for entire economic 
sectors and allow reductions to be sold, 
via permits, into industrialized countries’ 
compliance carbon markets. These twin 
elements of sectoral crediting contrast 
with project-by-project crediting, as is 
currently seen under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), and 
sector-level emission standards not 
linked to any market mechanism.
Properly designed and operated, 
sectoral crediting could unleash 
substantial investment in efficient 
emissions reductions across entire 
sectors. A quick look at the numbers 
makes the appeal of and need for sectoral 
crediting clear. The world now emits 
roughly 45,000 million CO2-equivalent 
tonnes of greenhouse gases annually.2 In 
order to avoid the most dangerous 
consequences of climate change, that 
number needs to decrease swiftly, and by 
at least one-half to two-thirds by 
mid-century.3 Neither the market-based 
project-by-project approach of the 
CDM nor sectoral non-market standards 
on their own are likely to achieve this 
goal.
According to the World Bank’s State 
and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010 
report, the CDM accounted for 200 
million tonnes of reductions below 
business-as-usual (BaU) levels in 2009, 
down from 400 the previous year.4 Total 
CDM reductions are estimated to reach 
1 billion tonnes by 2012 – far short of 
the amount needed.5 Moreover, the 
benefits of these reductions are offset by 
their transfer to cover industrialized 
nations’ emissions increases, and even if 
one project in any given sector in a 
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particular country reduces emissions, 
that gain could be offset by increases 
elsewhere in the same sector or elsewhere 
in the economy.
Mandated sectoral standards can be 
useful, but they have clear limits. 
Emissions reductions occur only up to 
the standard and often no further. Most 
importantly, standards usually take the 
form of limiting rates of emissions, or 
prescribing specific technologies. Rates 
may go down, but total emissions can 
still go up as output increases. Without a 
market component, there is little 
incentive for investors to seek reductions 
in total emissions.
Market-based sectoral crediting is 
gaining ground in some policy circles 
because it has the potential to move 
beyond the confines and risks of the 
CDM and standards, catalysing a faster, 
more effective transition to clean 
development. The Chinese steel sector 
provides an instructive example. 
McKinsey & Company estimates that by 
2030 its emissions reduction potential 
could be as much as 350 million tonnes 
below BaU projections.6 If other 
industrial sectors, such as chemicals and 
cement, are also included, the numbers 
quickly rise above 1 billion tonnes for 
China alone – equal to all CDM 
reductions by 2012.
Introducing some portion of these 
reductions as credits in carbon markets 
presents not just enormous opportunities 
but also some serious risks. With entire 
sectors capped, the consequences of 
unreliable or manipulated emissions 
reports, tainted verification processes, 
poor crediting methodology, or 
inadequate domestic legal and regulatory 
systems more broadly, grow 
exponentially. These risks make it crucial 
to get governance right in at least four 
areas.
First and foremost is the environmental 
integrity of the system. CDM projects 
that fail to reduce emissions exacerbate 
climate change. Non-performing sectoral 
crediting could have the same effect on a 
much larger scale. Credible measurement 
and reporting and conflict-of-interest-
free, independent verification and 
enforcement are crucial for environmental 
integrity and a robust carbon market. 
Although industries may raise concerns 
about disclosing commercially sensitive 
information, experience in industrialized 
and emerging economies shows that 
emissions data – including greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions – can be disclosed 
in ways that promote transparency and 
protect trade secrets.7
Second are risks associated with the 
CDM model of issuing credits for 
reductions below BaU. If sectoral 
approaches are premised on this model, 
they will not lead us toward sufficient 
global emissions reductions to avert 
dangerous climate change. At a 
minimum, industrialized countries have 
to adopt more stringent targets to absorb 
the growing number of credits. 
Discounting should also be introduced, 
by which a certain portion of sectoral 
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credits would be automatically retired 
from the market, guaranteeing a net 
reduction of emissions credits, rather 
than ‘emissions shifting’, thus ensuring 
environmental benefits. Moreover, BaU 
is a projection and, thus, inherently 
unverifiable. Awarding credits for 
reductions below BaU creates incentives 
to inflate BaU projections – maximizing 
crediting at the expense of the 
environment. This is especially true for 
fast-growing sectors and countries, 
whose emissions will increase rapidly 
with large uncertainties around BaU 
projections. Consequently, the 
governance of sectoral crediting must 
shift away from BaU, to a fundamentally 
different model: the negotiation of 
sector-wide, country-specific baselines, 
based on historical emissions data and 
always keeping the environmental 
implications in mind, with credits 
awarded for reductions below those 
baselines. Lastly, there is a clear need for 
countries to develop the capacity to 
ensure accuracy in measuring, reporting 
and verifying the absolute tonnes of their 
emissions reductions.
Risks are also associated with 
crediting reductions in ‘intensity’ rather 
than in absolute emissions. Crediting 
intensity reductions – i.e. emissions per 
unit of economic output or per unit of 
energy output – risks minting ‘credits’ 
that are actually emissions increases if 
intensity declines occur amid high 
growth in output and energy use. 
Reducing total emissions is what matters 
to the atmosphere. Sectoral credits ought 
to be made, measured and reported in 
absolute tonnes of reductions from an 
absolute  base l ine .  Absolute 
measurements are also useful in highly 
heterogeneous sectors, in which firms 
use a host of different technologies to 
produce similar products.
Finally, risks come with carbon 
markets themselves. Any market requires 
proper infrastructure, regulatory 
guidance and oversight. Especially in 
their early stages, markets can experience 
volatility and the occasional start-up 
woes. We learnt important structural 
lessons from the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).8 
In April 2006 EU ETS prices dropped 
by a half within five days as the first 
official figures were published, revealing 
that overall emissions were lower than 
had previously been assumed, and that 
credits had therefore been over-allocated. 
In April 2010 the EU published official 
data for 2009, showing that emissions 
had fallen by over 10 per cent. The 
market hardly budged. Prices already 
reflected expectations of lower emissions, 
based partly on the economic crisis and 
partly on the effectiveness of the ETS. 
The lesson: timely data, a liquid market, 
policy certainty and the ability to save 
reductions over time – the ‘banking’ of 
credits – also matter.
Proper market governance is similarly 
crucial. In both industrialized and 
developing countries, transparent and 
accountable agencies must be responsible 
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for maintaining mutually recognizable 
registries to track transactions and fund 
flows. Firms that monitor emissions and 
calculate baselines should be prohibited 
from marketing credits to avoid conflicts 
of interest. Such structural transparency 
offers important co-benefits – public 
participation in policy processes and 
better institutions for development – 
that reinforce the durability of the 
reductions achieved and the sustainability 
of the market itself.
Private investors may face additional 
risks under sectoral approaches 
compared to CDM. The role for policy 
here is not to eliminate risk, but to create 
the appropriate incentives to ensure that 
private capital and insurance markets can 
manage and mitigate it.
Sectoral crediting is not a goal in itself. 
The goal is to enable a rapid transition to 
enforceable, absolute emissions limits for 
all major emitting sectors, powered by a 
broad carbon market made up of global 
or linked national or regional emissions 
trading systems.
The first sectoral credit has yet to be 
issued. That allows us to get governance 
right and keep the goal in sight from the 
beginning. It is a tall yet not 
insurmountable order, and a step we 
ought to take to ensure that, if sectoral 
crediting moves ahead, a system is 
created that ultimately stabilizes the 
climate and helps transform the over 
US$5,000 billion-a-year fossil-fuel-
based energy sector into a cleaner, 
greener future.9
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